judges to designate magistrate judges to hear pretrial motions, . . .
[m]agistrate judges serve as aides to, and under the supervision of, district judges. . . ." Id. at 13. The court explained that as Article I judicial officers, magistrate judges "ordinarily may not decide motions that are dispositive either of a case or of a claim or defense within a case . . . because the Constitution requires that Article III judges exercise final decisionmaking authority." Id. (footnote omitted). The court stated that under FED. R. CIV. P. 72, " [w] hen a magistrate judge decides a nondispositive motion, the district judge may, given a timely appeal, set aside the order if it is 'clearly erroneous or is contrary to law,'" but "when a magistrate judge passes upon a dispositive motion, he or she may only issue a recommended decision, and if there is a timely objection, the district judge must engage in de novo review." Id. at 14. The court noted that a motion to stay litigation is "not among the motions enumerated in [the Federal Magistrates Act]," nor "of the same character." Id. Nevertheless, the court stated that a "federal court's ruling on a motion to stay litigation pending arbitration is not dispositive of either the case or any claim or defense within it," and " [a] lthough granting or denying a stay may be an important step in the life of a case . . . a stay order is merely suspensory." Id. In addition, the court explained that " [e] ven if such a motion is granted, the court still retains authority to dissolve the stay or, after the arbitration has run its course, to make orders with respect to the arbitral award." Id. The court also pointed out that because the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitral awards does not extinguish the possibility of such review," there "is no final exercise of Article III power at the time the court acts on the motion to stay." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that "from a procedural standpoint," district judges would comport with Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 in employing a "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard when reviewing a magistrate judge's denial of a motion to stay litigation. Id. Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. 2010) QUESTION: Whether a "securities professional can be said to 'make' a statement, such that liability under 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5(b) may attach, either by (i) using statements to sell securities, regardless of whether those statements were crafted entirely by others, or (ii) directing the offering and sale of securities on behalf of an underwriter, thus making an implied statement that he has a reasonable basis to believe that the key representations in the relevant prospectus are truthful and complete." Id. at 442. Whether "an arrest warrant issued by a foreign court [in Bosnia] that no longer has jurisdiction over the accused, nor the power to enforce the warrant, can provide an adequate basis for the extradition of a United States citizen." Id. at 54.
ANALYSIS:
The court noted that the 7th, 8th and 9th Circuits have "determined that, where an extradition treaty does not condition extradition on the filing of formal charges, [they] would not read such a requirement into the treaty." Id. at 64. The court went on to add that whether "extradition treaties should contain provisions ensuring that a judicial body in the requesting country stand ready to ensure procedural regularity upon the transfer of custody" is a question "for the executive branch to decide." Id. at 65-66 (emphasis in original). The court thus focused on the question of "whether the offense charged is extraditable under the relevant [U.S.-Bosnia extradition] treaty.'" Id. at 66. The court noted that the treaty requires that an individual sought for extradition must have been charged with a crime. Id. at 67. The court read the treaty's provisions to mean that "the proof required . . . to establish that an individual has been 'charged' with a crime is a valid arrest warrant and the evidence submitted in order to obtain that warrant." Id. The court reasoned that because " [t] he arrest warrant for [the petitioner] was never re-issued -or otherwise ratified -by a Bosnian court with jurisdiction over [the] case . . . the existence of this arrest warrant . . . cannot satisfy the Treaty's requirement that Bosnia demonstrate a 'charge' by producing a valid arrest warrant." Id.
CONCLUSION:
The 9th Circuit held that an arrest warrant issued by a Bosnian court that no longer has jurisdiction over the accused, nor the power to enforce the warrant, is not an adequate basis for the extradition of a United States citizen. Id. at 69.
United States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2009) QUESTION:
Whether a sentencing enhancement is appropriate "where a defendant has obstructed the investigation or prosecution of an underlying offense but has not obstructed the investigation or prosecution of a subsequent money laundering offense." Id. at 224 (emphasis in original).
ANALYSIS:
The 2nd Circuit noted that the obstruction of justice guideline set forth in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 "contains two elements: (1) a temporal element, which requires the obstruction to occur during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the offense of conviction and (2) a nexus element, which requires that the obstructive conduct relate to the offense of conviction." Id. at 227. The court held that the first element was met because "defendant's obstructive conduct occurred during the government's investigation into the money laundering offense." Id. Furthermore, the court determined that the second element was satisfied because defendant's witness tampering "relate[s] to fraud, which is relevant conduct or at least an offense that is closely related to the money laundering offense." Id. at 228.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit concluded "that Application Note 2(C) to section 2S1.1 of the Guidelines does not preclude an enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines where a defendant's obstruction relates to an offense underlying a money laundering offense but not to the money laundering offense itself." Id. at 224. ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the NSA's response to the request for information was properly tethered to FOIA Exemption 3, which "applies to records specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," because "acknowledging the existence or nonexistence of the [requested] information . . . would reveal the NSA's organization, functions, and activities, in contravention of . . . the National Security Act of 1959." Id. at 71-72 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also gave substantial weight to the NSA's affidavits, as there was no "evidence that the NSA invoked the Glomar doctrine in order to conceal illegal or unconstitutional activities," nor did the court "have reason to believe that the NSA was acting in bad faith in providing a [plaintiff's] attempts to invoke the state-created danger doctrine as a basis for relief" after her application for asylum, request for withholding of removal, and request for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) were denied. Id. at *1, *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that plaintiff's argument that the BIA should have invoked the state-created danger doctrine as a basis for relief raised an issue of first impression in the 2nd Circuit. Id. at *3. The court, however, saw "no reason to disagree with the BIA's conclusion, which relies on cases holding that the state-created danger doctrine does not apply in immigration proceedings." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that it "will not disturb the BIA's conclusion" regarding the inapplicability of the state-created danger doctrine to immigration proceedings. Id. [ing] as an 'employee,' and not as a 'citizen,' when he notifies his supervisors, either formally or informally, of an issue regarding the safety of his workplace that touches upon a matter of public concern, as well as on the employee's own private interests." Id. at 200.
ANALYSIS:
The court first noted a Supreme Court decision which held that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." Id. at 201. The court next determined whether speech that is not specifically required by a public employee's job duties is also insulated from Constitutional attack. Id. at 202. In light the Supreme Court decision, the court reasoned that "speech made 'pursuant to' a public employee's job duties as 'speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities.'" Id. at 201. Further, the court noted that the phrase "pursuant to" a government employee's official duties should not be construed too narrowly. Id. at 202. Finally, the court noted that "other circuit courts have concluded that speech that government employers have not expressly required may still be 'pursuant to official duties,' so long as the speech is in furtherance of such duties." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that "speech can be 'pursuant to' a public employee's official job duties even though it is not required by, or included in, the employee's job description, or in response to a request by the employer" and such speech is not protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 203. 
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ANALYSIS:
The court reasoned that a two-step "modified categorical approach" has been established to determine "[w]hether a prior conviction following a guilty plea to a statutory offense is a qualifying predicate for a Guidelines enhancement." Id. The court acknowledged that the approach, by its terms, applied to statutory offenses; however, nothing suggested that "the analysis is different with respect to common law crimes, nor is there any reason in principle that it should be." Id. at 444. The court also noted that "criminal statutes often incorporate elements of common law offenses, and in these circumstances, [it has] looked to the common law to determine whether the prior conviction was a qualifying predicate offense." Id. Finally, the court agreed with the 9th Circuit, which held that "when a 'state crime is defined by specific and identifiable common law elements, rather than by a specific statute, the common law definition of a crime serves as a functional equivalent of a statutory definition.'" Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that "the modified categorical approach applicable in this circuit to prior convictions for statutory offenses also applies to prior convictions for state common law crimes." Id. at 442. ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit discussed "the rule of finality embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291," noting that there are certain exceptions to this rule where "discretionary jurisdiction is conferred upon courts of appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), to consider interlocutory orders where the district judge is 'of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.'" Id. at 45. The court acknowledged that "the 'collateral order doctrine' was established to permit appeals from a limited class of orders 'which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,' and 'too important' and 'too independent' of the cause of action to require entry of final judgment as a pre-condition." Id. The court found that "while the order [denying the appointment of new counsel] (1) does conclusively determine a disputed question and (2) resolves an issue completely separate from the merits of the prosecution, it is not (3) effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Id. at 49. The court stated, "the claimed right to counsel here does not implicate . . . a right not to be tried on account of a violation of a constitutional or statutory protection." Id. Additionally, the court declared that it has never "directly determined that . . . an order denying a psychiatric examination is immediately appealable, although we have alluded to that question in dictum." Id. The court found that a ruling that the defendant is competent and must proceed to trial "could be effectively reviewed and remedied, if erroneous, on appeal from any final judgment . . ." Id. at 50.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that "an order denying the appointment of counsel does not fit within the collateral order doctrine so as to permit an interlocutory appeal." Id. at 49. Further, the 2nd Circuit held that "denial of a psychiatric examination, which is in effect a holding that [the defendant] is competent to stand trial and must proceed to trial, is not immediately appealable." Id. at 50. ANALYSIS: The court stated that "the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do similar statutory work." Id. Recognizing that similarities between two statutes is generally insufficient to borrow a statute of limitation, the court stressed "that there are few federal statutes as closely related, and under which such similar claims may be brought, as the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." Id. at 735-36. Due to the close relationship between the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the court reasoned that it would "not make sense that the virtually identical claims made under these two statutes would be treated differently from a statute-of-limitations perspective." Id. at 736.
THIRD CIRCUIT
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held "that the IDEA's two-year statute of limitations applies to claims made for education under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." Id. at 737. (1)(iii). Id. at 588.
ANALYSIS:
The court began its analysis by reviewing 8 C.F.R. § 208(b)(1)(iii), which states, in relevant part, that "an applicant who has suffered past persecution and who does not face a reasonable possibility of future persecution may be granted asylum if he or she has demonstrated 'compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to that country arising out of the severity of the past persecution' . . . [or] . . . has established 'that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country [.] " Id. at 593. The 3rd Circuit looked to the 9th Circuit's standard which holds that "[a]bsent a likelihood of future persecution, asylum is warranted [under this subsection] only if [the applicant] demonstrates that in the past he or his family has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution." Id. at 594. The court also noted that the 4th and the 7th Circuit had "similarly reserved humanitarian asylum based on past persecution for the most atrocious abuse." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that humanitarian asylum is allowed only "where there are compelling reasons related to the severity of the past persecution," and reasonable possibility of facing serious harm upon return to the country. Id. at 595-96.
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009) QUESTION:
Whether the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) is unconstitutionally vague such that it has a "chilling effect" on speech and violates the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. Id. at 151.
ANALYSIS: The AEPA proscribes "physical disruptions" of animal enterprises when there is intent to cause "economic damage." Id. at 152. "The definitions section of the AEPA states that 'physical disruption' does not include any lawful disruption that results from lawful public, governmental, or animal enterprise employee reaction to the disclosure of information about an animal enterprise." Id. The court noted that "the term 'physical disruption' has a well-understood, common definition," and "the government must present the trier of fact with evidence that establishes that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused had the requisite intent to disrupt the functioning of an animal enterprise," both of which led the court to conclude that the statute is not fatally vague. ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit first invoked Tinker's language, noting that students and teachers do not necessarily "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 295. However, the court also acknowledged that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id. at 296. In mediating between these two principles, the 3rd Circuit declined to specifically decide "whether a school official may discipline a student for her lewd, vulgar, or offensive off-campus speech that has an effect on-campus" because such a question is properly governed by Tinker. Id. at 298.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that "Tinker applies to student speech, whether on-or off-campus, that causes or threatens to cause a substantial disruption of or material interference with school or invades the rights of other members of the school community." Id. at 307-08. ANALYSIS: The court noted that there is a presumption that "[w]hen a fee-shifting statute does not explicitly permit a fee award against counsel, it prohibits it" and that such a presumption had not been overcome in this case. Id. at 825. The court then reasoned that even though § 1447(c) amends the American rule -"parties bear their own legal costs" -to permit fee-shifting from the prevailing party to the losing party, the statute's " [t] ANALYSIS: With regard to the first issue, the 4th Circuit recognized that constitutional claims under the Ex Post Facto Clause are governed by a two-part test. Id. at *7. First, a court must "ask whether the legislature's intent was to impose a punishment or merely enact a civil or regulatory law." Id. at *8. The second step requires a court to "determine whether the disability is so punitive in fact as to negate any civil or regulatory intent." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court looked to persuasive case law in finding the North Carolina statute constitutional. Id.
FOURTH CIRCUIT
Assuming a state's power to retroactively strip a felon of a previously restored right to possess firearms, the 4th Circuit next queried whether "stripping a restored right to possess firearms effectively revives a previously negated predicate conviction" under the NCFFA. Id. at *12. The court looked to an analogous Illinois felon in possession law, and adopted the 7th Circuit's logic that past "convictions were once again available" for sentencing enhancements one the restored right had been stripped. Id. at *13-14.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that a state statute which retroactively strips a felon of a previously restored right to possess firearms is constitutional. Id. at *8. The 4th Circuit further concluded that such an act also revives previously negated corresponding convictions for purposes of sentencing enhancement under the NCFFA. Id. at *14.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2009) QUESTION: Whether a circuit court can grant a writ of mandamus directing a district court to reconsider a pretrial multidistrict litigation (MDL) decision. Id. at 410.
ANALYSIS: The court addressed this issue in two parts. Id. First, the court adopted the view that "transferor courts should use the law of the case doctrine to determine whether to revisit a transferee court's decision." Id. at 411. Therefore, "a successor judge has the same discretion to reconsider an order as would the first judge, but should not overrule the earlier judge's order or judgment merely because the later judge might have decided matters differently." Id. Next, in addressing whether it could properly grant mandamus given the procedural posture of the case, the court noted that " [t] he law of the case doctrine requires that courts not revisit the determinations of an earlier court unless (i) the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, (ii) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or (iii) the decision was clearly erroneous and would work . . . manifest injustice." Id. at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finding a clearly erroneous decision working manifest injustice, the court found that the "the transferor court should have reconsidered the MDL court's . . . decision." Id. at 414.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that it could issue a writ of mandamus on a district court's refusal to reconsider a pretrial MDL decision. Id. ANALYSIS: The court first determined that, in the present case, the "interrelation" of the subordinated securities claims and equity interests was "contingent and presently knowable." Id. The court then reasoned that a "court's decision to approve a plan that provides . ANALYSIS: The court explained that the "Texas courts have repeatedly affirmed that an insurer's duty to defend is separate from and broader than its duty to indemnify." Id. at 694. The court found that the insurer had a duty to defend based on "uniform holdings of Texas courts that if even a single claim in a lawsuit potentially falls within an insurance policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to provide a complete defense." Id. at 695. The court determined that the plaintiff insurance companies made compulsory payments beyond their fair share. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit affirmed the defendant insurance company's duty to defend common insured and that plaintiff-appellants "are entitled to collect a proportionate share of defense costs" from defendant. Id. at 696.
Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2010) QUESTION: Whether insurance companies are considered bank customers in the context of a negligence claim, and thus can be afforded protection under state tort law. Id. at 231.
ANALYSIS:
The court noted that the duties on financial organizations depend on whether the claimant is a customer or a third party. Id. at 229. Further, the court noted that the imposition of a duty is a question of public policy. Id. at 231. The court recognized that "it is clearly the fear of imposing on banks endless, unpredictable liability that drives [the state's] distinction between a bank's customers and noncustomers." Id. The court posited that there is no risk in imposing duties on the insurance companies as customers for three reasons. Id. First, the "funds in the accounts were registered to the insurance companies." Id. Second, the "addresses and taxpayer identification numbers utilized in opening the accounts made it abundantly clear that the named [insurance companies] were separate and distinct [from the holding company]." Id. Third, the insurance companies received "monthly statements and confirmations of account activity." Id. Thus, the court determined that "imposing the limited duties of care flowing to customers would hardly be crippling [to insurance companies]; nor would it 'unreasonably expand' banks' 'orbit of duty.'" Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that insurance companies can qualify as a customers and "access the protections afforded to that status under [state] tort law, if it opens the account itself or has some equivalently direct personal relationship with the financial institution." Id. at 232.
Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010) QUESTION: Whether "Louisiana owes full faith and credit to the subject New York adoption decree." Id. at 703.
The court first noted that the Clause is different from res judicata because res judicata is a voluntary restraint by a forum state from exercising its power so as to respect the judgment of another state, whereas "the Clause is a mandatory, constitutional curb on every state's sovereign power" and "[w]ith respect to judgments (although not to statutes), a state as a rule has no discretion to disregard a decision of another state on a matter over which that other state is competent to exercise jurisdiction." Id. at 710 (emphasis in original). The court then reasoned that although " [t] here are limited exceptions to the mandate of the [Clause] that look behind the judgment to original court proceedings," these exceptions are "inapplicable here and are not advanced by the Registrar." Id. The court noted that "Louisiana owes 'exacting' full faith and credit to the New York adoption decree." Id. at 711. Finally, the court reasoned that the opponent's proffered argument "that adoption decrees are fundamentally different kinds of judgments and are not owed full faith and credit" was similar to other arguments that "have either been rejected by those courts that have considered them or simply reflect a fundamental misapprehension of the law and the Constitution. 
The court began by stating that judicial estoppel is "an equitable doctrine that preserves the integrity of the courts by preventing a party from abusing the judicial process through cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposite to suit an exigency of the moment." Id. at 470. The court reasoned that judicial estoppel "is applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court . . . ." Id. The court then noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th and 9th Circuits have held that "judicial estoppel is inappropriate when a party is merely changing its position in response to a change in the law." Id. The court also noted that the 10th Circuit has held that "judicial estoppel bars changes in factual positions and does not extend to inconsistent opinions or legal positions." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit, in adopting the position of its sister circuits, held that "judicial estoppel is not applicable where a party argues an inconsistent position based on a change in controlling law." Id. ANALYSIS: The court first asserted that "[i]t is fundamental in our civil system that each party to a lawsuit bears its own costs unless a statute or agreement provides otherwise." Id. at 857. Applying this policy to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the court found this statute requires a bond for recovery. Id. at 858. Next, the court recognized Supreme Court precedent that "a party injured by the issuance of an injunction later determined to be erroneous has no action for damages in the absence of a bond." Id.
Memphis
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held "that section seven of the Norris-LaGuardia Act allows recovery only in relation to a bond set according to the conditions in the act." Id. 
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ANALYSIS:
The court first noted that circuit precedent "clearly holds that an amendment which adds a new party creates a new cause of action and there is no relation back to the original filing for purposes of limitations." Id. at 318. Next, the court examined the plain language of the statute. Id. The court then reviewed decisions that applied relationback provisions of 15(c) in the case of misnomers or misdescriptions. Id. Finally, the court noted decisions by the 2nd Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit involving attempts by plaintiffs "to invoke Rule 15(c)'s relation-back provision under these circumstances." Id. at 319. CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a teacher does not qualify as a ministerial employee unless his or her primary function is to teach religious courses or play a major part in the spiritual mission of the church. Id. at 782.
CONCLUSION:
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
In re Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010) QUESTION: Whether CAFA requires the plaintiffs to document more than general state citizenship of the members of the proposed class to satisfy the home state exception requirement and avoid removal to federal court. Id. at 671.
ANALYSIS:
The court determined that the citizenship of class members cannot merely be based on phone numbers and mailing addresses. Id. at 675. Rather, the court noted two ways in which citizenship can be plead such that the home state exception would be met. Id. First, the plaintiffs can document state citizenship of a sample of the population, evidenced by "affidavits or survey responses in which putative class members reveal whether they intend to remain in [the state] indefinitely" and the court can rely on "statistical principles to reach a conclusion as to the likelihood that two-thirds or more of the proposed class members are citizens of [the state]." Id. at 676. Alternatively, the plaintiffs can define the class as all [state] citizens who purchased text messaging from the defendant or an alleged coconspirator in order to remain in state court. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that CAFA requires more than simply documenting general state citizenship to meet the home state QUESTION: Whether a caseworker and deputy sheriff, who were "concerned for the well-being of two young girls," violated the Fourth Amendment "when they seized and interrogated a minor in a private office at her school for two hours without a warrant, probable cause, or parental consent." Id. at 1015.
The court acknowledged that it has "yet to address the principles governing the in-school seizure of a suspected child abuse victim." Id. at 1022. The court stated that it had "previously held that the warrantless, non-emergency search and seizure of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse at her home violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. The court declined to differentiate between whether the seizure and interrogation took place at home or at school and held that traditional "Fourth Amendment protections apply to child abuse investigations." Id. 
The court took note of the Supreme Court's holding "that habeas corpus under the ICRA is the exclusive means for federalcourt review of tribal criminal proceedings." Id. at 760 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that " [t] he [Supreme] Court has also found that Congress considered and rejected proposals for federal review of alleged violations of the [ICRA] arising in a civil context." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court went on to explain that "[i]n interpreting § 1303, courts should hesitate to so expand the meaning of criminal and detention such that, as a practical matter, all tribal decisions affecting individual members in important areas of their lives become subject to review in federal court. Such a result would be inconsistent with the principle of broad, unreviewable tribal sovereignty in all but criminal cases involving physical detention." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[g]iven the often vast gulf between tribal traditions and those with which federal courts are more intimately familiar, the judiciary should not rush to create causes of QUESTION: "Whether the statutory right to be reasonably heard under the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA) requires the continuing attachment of written victim impact statements to a PSR." Id. at 1074.
The court noted that while the CVRA affords victims the "right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding," the statute does not define the term "right to be reasonably heard." Id. The court stated that "the term 'reasonably' is meant to allow for alternative methods of communicating a victim's views to the court when the victim is unable to attend the proceeding." Id. at 1075. The court further noted that "[n]othing in the statute plainly requires appending written victim impact statements to a PSR." Id. at 1074. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the legislative history only "suggests that Congress was concerned with ensuring that crime victims be allowed to speak at proceedings." Id. at 1075.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that "the CVRA provides victims the opportunity to communicate directly to the district court; it does not specifically require a district court to append a written statement to a PSR." Id.
United States v. Forrester, 592 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION ONE: Whether a defendant can "make a collateral attack on a [permanent scheduling order] in a criminal case." Id. at 978.
ANALYSIS:
The court noted that the 11th Circuit "is the only other circuit to have addressed this issue to date." Id. The court reasoned that not only are regulatory decisions "complex matter [s] ," but also where the agency is not a party, "it has no opportunity to defend its [decision] ." Id. The court further reasoned that allowing criminal defendants to attack such issues would "potentially place a continuing, onerous burden on district courts to constantly re-litigate the same issue." Id. at 979. Additionally, the court noted that the fact that "Congress has, at times, taken a more proactive stance toward controlling collateral challenges is not [persuasive] ." Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that "substantive collateral attacks on permanent scheduling orders are impermissible in criminal cases where defendants' sentences will be determined by those scheduling orders." Id.
QUESTION TWO: "Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which mandates disclosure of the wiretap application, allows the government to redact some information in the application." Id. at 984.
The court noted that the 7th Circuit held in a previous case that "a defendant does not have a right to redacted portions of a wiretap application if the government is able (and willing) to defend the warrant without relying on the redacted information." Id. The 9th Circuit further noted that at least two district courts have found the 7th Circuit's holding to be correct. Id. at n.8. Additionally, the court reasoned that in some situations, such as protecting informants, "the privilege to withhold information . . . is well-established." Id. at 984.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that where "the unredacted parts of the wiretap application [are] more than sufficient to establish necessity," the government may redact some information in the application. Id. at 985. ANALYSIS: The court noted that "[a] statute or regulation that imposes retroactive punishment violates the constitutional prohibition on the passage of ex post facto laws." Id. at 930. The court further noted that "Congressional intent . . . notwithstanding, we will find an ex post facto violation if the effect of SORNA's juvenile registration provision is punitive." Id. at (emphasis in original). The court reasoned that such a determination depends on a variety of factors, including: "the terms of the statute, the legal obligations it imposes, the practical and predictable consequences of those obligations, our societal experience in general, and the application of our own reason and logic, establish conclusively that the statute has a punitive effect." Id. at 931. The court further reasoned that the "juvenile registration provision imposes a disability that is neither 'minor' nor 'indirect,' but rather severely damaging to former juvenile offenders' economic, social, psychological, and physical well-being." Id. at 933.
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that "SORNA's juvenile registration and reporting requirement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution." Id. at 942. ANALYSIS: The court first observed that "an arrangement to turn over or to redistribute tips is presumptively valid." Id. at 579. The plaintiff argued that under 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) "an employee must be allowed to retain all of her tips -except in the case of a 'valid' tip pool involving only customarily tipped employees -regardless of whether her employer claims a tip credit." Id. at 580. The court analyzed 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) and concluded that "the plain text . . . imposes conditions on taking a tip credit and does not state freestanding requirements pertaining to all tipped employees." Id. at 581 (emphasis in original). The court also found that the FLSA "does not restrict tip pooling when no tip credit is taken" and concluded that the employee's "contributions to the pool did not, and could not, reduce her wages below the statutory minimum." Id. at 582.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded that because "nothing in the text of the FLSA purports to restrict employee tip-pooling arrangements when no tip credit is taken, [it could] perceive no statutory impediment to [the restaurant's] practice." Id. at 583. ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit found that of the three other circuit courts to consider the issue, all three have found that excessive fees for services actually provided are not in violation of RESPA. Id. Section 8(b) of RESPA authorizes charges for "services actually performed." Id. at 553.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit joined its sister circuits, holding that "Section 8(b) is unambiguous and does not extend to overcharges" for services actually provided. Id. at 554.
TENTH CIRCUIT
City of Colo. Springs v. Climax Molybdenum, 587 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir.
2009) QUESTION:
Whether a "proposed intervenor may establish standing, and thus federal court jurisdiction over its motion to intervene, by 'piggybacking' on the standing of an existing party to a lawsuit over which the district court has retained jurisdiction but within which there is no current, active dispute among the parties." Id. at 1073.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit turned to 11th and 7th Circuits for guidance in addressing this first impression issue. Id. at 1080-81. First, the court conveyed its agreement with the 11th Circuit's holding that a prospective intervenor "may piggyback upon the standing of a existing party to a case, provided that there is 'a justiciable case or controversy at the point at which intervention is sought.'" Id. at 1081. The court also agreed with 11th Circuit's limitation that "[i]ntervenors must show independent standing to continue a suit if the original parties on whose behalf intervention was sought settle or otherwise do not remain adverse parties in the litigation." Id. The court then stated that since a justiciable case or controversy is necessary when intervention is sought, "[n]either the mere existence of a consent decree nor the continuation of the district court's jurisdiction for enforcement purposes is enough to support piggyback standing absent an existing dispute between the original parties." Id. Finally, the court looked to the 7th Circuit's rationale that a "case or controversy must be present at every moment of the litigation," and held that "mere retained jurisdiction over a case does not create a perpetual case or controversy, even for the original parties to the case." Id. at 1081.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit concluded that "within litigation over which a district court has retained jurisdiction after entering a final decree, a proposed intervenor may not establish piggyback standing where the existing parties in the suit are not seeking judicial resolution of an active dispute among themselves." Id. at 1081. 
ANALYSIS:
The court examined the definition of "prisoner" contained in the PLRA, which specifies that a prisoner is "any person incarcerated or detained . . . who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." Id. at 927 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court recognized that an individual committed under the KSVPA is detained because he or she "poses a threat of future danger due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder." Id. The court noted that other circuits have "unanimously concluded that individuals who are civilly committed are not 'prisoners' within the meaning of the PLRA." Id. The court also referenced the Supreme Court's conclusion that a commitment under the KSVPA is a process "civil in nature," and not criminal. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the "fee payment provisions of § 1915 applicable to a 'prisoner,' as defined by § 1915(h) ANALYSIS: The court noted that "ERISA authorizes a judicial action challenging an administrative denial of benefits but does not specify the standard of review that courts should apply." Id. at 1315. The court adhered to the Supreme Court's holding that "a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court determined that " [u] nder trust principles, a deferential standard of review is appropriate when trustees actually exercise a discretionary power vested in them by the instrument under which they act." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court found that the administrator's failure to timely issue a final decision meant "the remedies were deemed exhausted by operation of law rather than the exercise of administrative discretion." Id. at 1316. Accordingly, because the administrative body did not actually exercise its discretion, a deferential review of the administrative decision was inappropriate. hether a defendant's criminal history category can be increased for committing an offense while serving under a 'criminal justice sentence' where the probationary term he was serving at the time of the offense only later qualified as a 'criminal justice sentence' due to events that took place after the defendant committed the offense of conviction." Id. at 1354.
The court looked to the plain language of the sentencing statute for the meaning of "under any criminal justice sentence." Id. at 1355. The Court found that when a defendant is not "under" a "criminal justice sentence" at the time he committed any of the conduct leading to conviction, his criminal history category cannot be increased. Id.
CONCLUSION:
The court held that a defendant's criminal history category cannot be increased for committing an offense while serving under a criminal justice sentence where the probationary term he was serving later qualified as a criminal justice sentence due to events subsequent to defendant's commission of the conviction offense. Id. ANALYSIS: The court began by looking at the type of evidence needed to uphold a conspiracy conviction. Id. The 10th Circuit noted that more than a casual relationship must be shown by looking at the circumstances of the case. Id. at 1331-32. The court found that although the petitioner had introduced the common supplier to another drug dealer, the interaction between the three people was friendly rather than aimed towards a conspiracy. Id. at 1332. The 10th Circuit also found it significant that the petitioner did not receive an economic benefit from the introduction, and was not involved in any drug transaction between the common supplier and the other drug dealer. Id.
United
CONCLUSION: The introduction of the common supplier, made by one drug dealer to another drug dealer, cannot alone demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed between the three people. Id. ANALYSIS: The court reviewed numerous cases that concluded "physician-specific information such as experience is relevant to the informed consent issue and physicians have a duty to voluntarily disclose such information prior to obtaining a patient's consent." Id. The court reviewed a split of authority between state courts regarding whether a physician has "a duty to truthfully answer [patient's] physician-specific questions." Id. at 1256.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the "Wyoming Supreme Court would allow an informed consent claim where a physician lies to a patient as to physician-specific information in direct response to a patient's questions concerning the same in the course of obtaining the patient's consent and the questions seek concrete verifiable facts, not the doctor's subjective opinion or judgment as to the quality of his performance or abilities." Id. at 1260.
United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2010) QUESTION: Whether the district court commits reversible error "when a defendant's prior conviction merits criminal history points, but the defendant does not receive those points, and the district court nevertheless imposes a sentence taking into account that prior conviction to set the offense level." Id. at 1147.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that because the defendant's prior conviction was a third-degree felony and carried a jail sentence of 180 days, "two criminal history points should have been assigned to [defendant] for the conviction under § 4A1.1(b), [the criminal sentencing statute], as his sentence exceeded sixty days, but was less than one year and one month." Id. at 1149. The court determined that "the district court's error was in failing to assign criminal history points for the offense, rather than in calculating the relevant offense guidelines range." Id. Furthermore, the court opined that "the failure to assign [defendant] criminal history points for his prior conviction did not change his criminal history category, and thus had no effect on his overall sentence." Id. at 1149.
CONCLUSION:
The 10th Circuit held that no reversible error occurred in "the district court's calculation of [defendant's] Whether "a defendant, who was convicted under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, and who has served the state statutory maximum term of incarceration, may be sentenced to further imprisonment upon revocation of his supervised release." Id. at 1374.
ANALYSIS:
The court first noted that it is settled law that "a term of supervised release may be imposed in addition to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment." Id. at 1376 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The court then noted that in non-ACA cases, it had concluded "the district court had the authority to sentence a defendant to [prison time] for violating his supervised release terms despite the fact that he had already served the maximum statutory prison term." Id. at 1377. The court stated that this authority stemmed from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which "granted the district court discretion in certain circumstances to revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court reasoned that the rationale underlying non-ACA cases also applied to ACA cases. Id. The primary function of supervised release is to provide post-imprisonment supervision and without a court's authority to further imprison, supervised release would lack the deterrent mechanism that Congress intended. § 1957(f) (1) excludes the defendants from prosecution for money laundering under § 1957(a) , where the monetary transactions were "made for the purpose of securing legal representation." Id. at 876.
ANALYSIS: "Section 1957(a) prohibits knowingly engaging or attempting to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity." Id at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court stated that "the statute exempts any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)(citation omitted). Thus, the court found that "the plain meaning of the exemption set forth in § 1957(f)(1), when considered in its context, is that transactions involving criminally derived proceeds are exempt from the prohibitions of § 1957(a) when they are for the purpose of securing legal representation to which an accused is entitled under the Sixth Amendment." Id. The court found that, "[a]ccordingly, the exemption is limited to attorneys' fees paid for representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment in a criminal proceeding and does not extend to attorneys' fees paid for other purposes." Id. The court determined that a prior Supreme Court decision, holding "that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not protect the right of a criminal defendant to use criminally derived proceeds for legal fees [,] . . . has no bearing on § 1957(f)(1) and indeed supports the conclusion that such proceeds have been statutorily exempted from criminal penalties." Id. The court commented that " [t] he Government has pointed to no principle of statutory construction-nor indeed to any legal principle-that supports the conclusion that a statutory provision may be 'nullified' by a Supreme Court decision on a completely different issue, absent any indication that Congress intended such a result." Id. The court found that it "would . . . make little sense-and would be entirely superfluous-to read § 1957(f) (1) as an exemption from criminal penalties for non-tainted proceeds spent on legal representation, as those funds can always be used for any legal purpose." Id. at 879.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that "the district court was eminently correct in holding that [d] efendants are not subject to criminal prosecution under § 1957(a) , because the plain language of § 1957(f)(1) clearly exempts criminally derived proceeds used to secure legal representation to which an accused is entitled under the Sixth Amendment." Id.
United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: "When a district court intends to rely on new information in deciding a motion for the modification of a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), whether each party is entitled to notice of the information and an opportunity to respond." Id. at 1241.
ANALYSIS:
The court reasoned that in deciding the issue, it should consider the policy statements accompanying the United States Sentencing Guidelines for applicable principles. Id. at 1242. The court specifically looked to a policy statement that echoes the spirit embodied in Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. That statement provides, "[w]hen any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor." Id. at 1242-43. The court also relied on 11th Circuit precedent acknowledging the "due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises or inaccurate information." Id. at 1243. The court further relied on the 5th and the 8th Circuit's conclusion that a party should be afforded the opportunity to review and respond to information provided. Id. at 1244.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that "each party must be given notice of and an opportunity to contest new information relied on by the district court in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding." Id. at 1245. 
